Memory often serves as the key or only evidence in the courtroom. Whether the witness is a child or an adult, all memory-based evidence is reconstructive. This is because memories are not veridical records of experience but are fragmented remnants of what happened in the past, pieced together in a 'sensible' manner according to the rememberer's current worldview 1, 2 . The reliability of memories may be questionable in general, but several additional issues should be considered when forensic evidence comes from adults recalling childhood experiences. These issues are the focus of this article.
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First, memories that are formed during childhood are different from memories that are formed during adolescence and adulthood in terms of both longevity and content. These differences have important consequences for what judges and jurors should expect to hear from complainants when they testify about childhood experiences, especially regarding the amount and type of details being remembered 3 
. Second, to be remembered in adulthood, childhood memories must have been retained for considerable periods of time. However, during that time, memories can change or even disappear owing to a process known as reconsolidation 4, 5 . These memory-related facts are often not known by judges and jurors, who must then rely on their own 'common sense' views of memory and memory development when evaluating the reliability of memory-based evidence. These views can be at odds [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] with what has been revealed by the scientific study of memory and its development. For example, many jurors and legal professionals (such as judges, lawyers and police officers) in North America 6 and Europe (for example, Sweden 11 and Norway
12
) are naive when it comes to understanding how memories are formed, how they become distorted over time and how stress and emotion affect remembering 13, 14 . Jurors are similarly naive about whether children can remember events that happen only once, events that are traumatic or which factors can affect the accuracy of memories across childhood (for example, suggestibility and repeated questioning) 15 . Indeed, these naive but 'common sense' beliefs directly influence the verdicts that jurors render in court 16 
The purpose of this article is to debunk these naive beliefs by reviewing recent scientific advances from behavioural and neuroscientific studies concerning the development of declarative memory during childhood. I also discuss factors that can influence the long-term retention of childhood memories and the effects of stress on memory. Finally, I consider the implications of these findings for courtroom cases that involve evidence based on memories of childhood experiences.
Development of declarative memory
Declarative memory, also known as explicit memory, is memory of facts and experiences. When experiences are encoded with respect to the self, memory is considered autobiographical; that is, they are not just memories of events that happened, they are memories of events that happened to 'me' . It is this form of declarative memory that we are dealing with in the courtroom; namely, adults remembering events that they experienced when they were children. In this section, I discuss the recent behavioural and neurobiological data concerning the development of autobiographical declarative memory from infancy through childhood.
Findings from behavioural studies. There is considerable evidence that most if not all memories from very early childhood (that is, from 18 to 24 months of age) are effectively lost or are certainly not available to conscious recall; this phenomenon is known as infantile amnesia 1, 17 . Research in humans and non-human animals has shown that forgetting occurs more rapidly in younger members of the species [18] [19] [20] [21] . This increased sensitivity of early memories to forgetting extends into the preschool years 22 . Therefore, it is not surprising that studies in adults show that very few events from early childhood are remembered, even events that occurred somewhat later in childhood (that is, before the age of 5 to 7 years; this is known as childhood amnesia) (FIG. 1) .
Several phenomena that underpin the absence of autobiographical memories of early childhood experiences have emerged from behavioural studies. Before I review these findings, it is important to note that autobiographical memory has an episodic component (the who, what, where and when of an event, including the personal experience of the event) and a semantic component (factual information that is independent of the specific event in which that information was acquired, including the meaning of the event) 1, 23, 24 . To illustrate these components, I know not only that grapefruits are bitter (semantic knowledge (or semantic memory)), I also remember the first time I tasted the bitterness of a grapefruit (episodic memory). Episodic and semantic components develop in parallel throughout childhood and adolescence 1, [23] [24] [25] . For example, younger children's narrative recall of a recent event is sparser -it contains fewer (particularly peripheral) details about the experience -than older children's recall of a recent event 1, 25 , suggesting that fewer details are stored in episodic memory in younger children. Accordingly, although young children are frequently correct in the basic facts of what happened (for example, we went on a trip to the museum), their narratives do not contain many of the additional details (for example, it was a warm and sunny day, I was wearing my favourite dress, we learnt what a curator was, and so on) that are found in older children's narratives.
Parallel developments occur in the semantic components of children's autobiographical memory 1, [24] [25] [26] . One way to study Abstract | Adults frequently provide compelling, detailed accounts of early childhood experiences in the courtroom. Judges and jurors are asked to decide guilt or innocence based solely on these decades-old memories using 'common sense' notions about memory. However, these notions are not in agreement with findings from neuroscientific and behavioural studies of memory development. Without expert guidance, judges and jurors may have difficulty in properly adjudicating the weight of memory evidence in cases involving adult recollections of childhood experiences.
these developmental changes in the organization of semantic knowledge is by asking children to make similarity judgements among concepts or objects. Using multidimensional scaling analyses to calculate relational (or associative; that is, semantic) distances between these concepts, one can map how these distances change across age. When 4-year-olds and 9-year-olds rated the same set of concepts for their similarity, different scaling solutions were obtained 26 ( FIG. 2) , indicating that the knowledge base of older children is organized differently -that is, concepts are inter-related in a qualitatively different manner -from that of younger children in ways that can have behavioural consequences. For example, semantic distances between concepts for younger children predict confusions among those concepts for children of that age but not for older children. Indeed, these distances have been used to predict susceptibility to memory illusions (for example, spontaneous false memories) [27] [28] [29] and to anticipate age-based changes in children's vulnerability to suggestion 26 . Interestingly, younger children (4-to 7-year-olds) generate fewer spontaneous false memories than older children (9-to 12-year-olds) and adults 25, [27] [28] [29] . Specifically, when asked to remember a list of associatively related terms (for example, nap, doze, pillow, bed, dream, snore, and so on) younger children (for example, 7-year-olds) remember fewer presented words than do older children and adults, and are less likely to falsely 'remember' the non-presented but associated word 'sleep' (REFS 25, (27) (28) (29) . This is thought to be because their knowledge base -or the semantic component of memory -is not as well developed as that of older children and adults. This does not mean that spontaneous false memories do not occur in young children; they do, especially when age-sensitive materials are used [27] [28] [29] . That age-appropriate materials increase false memory rates in children is critical when we consider what adults are remembering about their childhood experiences. If one is truly recalling an event from childhood, then the language and concepts being used in that memory should correspond to the person's knowledge base at the time of the event and not to what they surmise to have been the case given their current, adult worldview. For example, the concept of disgust does not usually develop until approximately the age of 5 years 30 , so memories involving this concept cannot have been encoded before that age. Indeed, there is evidence that the concepts and words used to retrieve true early memories are age-appropriate to the memories themselves 31 . A second, related, phenomenon that underpins childhood amnesia is that young children have considerable difficulty binding the different aspects of an event together into an integrated memory trace 23 . Binding refers to both the integration of features encoded from the environment into a cohesive trace and the subsequent integration of this trace with information that is already stored in memory. Binding captures both semantic relations (for example, integrating elements such as bird with wings, feathers and flight) and episodic relations (for example, the location of where one was when seeing an eagle capture a salmon). There is some evidence that children are better at binding features of an event when those events are personally significant 32 . Nevertheless, the development of binding ability during childhood and into adolescence facilitates encoding, storage and retrieval processes. Interestingly, these processes involve the hippocampus and the prefrontal cortex (PFC), areas that undergo structural and functional changes at this time [33] [34] [35] (see below). This behavioural evidence shows that improvements that occur during childhood in the ability to encode, store and retrieve information are associated with an increased ability to bind information into coherent memories. This ability to identify relationships between features helps to shape the child's emerging knowledge base (including knowledge about the self) and enables the extraction of abstract (semantic) knowledge from episodic experiences. As the ability to integrate newly encoded information into relational structures develops -along with the ability to integrate these structures with memories that are already in storage -more stable and better-integrated memories are stored, ones that not only contain more information but may also be better preserved over time.
A third phenomenon that is associated with the fragility of early memories is that their episodic components usually deteriorate more rapidly than the meaning or core components 36 . This means that although the central features of experiences (for example, that I went to a museum when I was young) are preserved in memory, additional, perhaps more peripheral details of those experiences (for example, what time of day the Box 1 | Adults' courtroom evidence of alleged memories of childhood events When asked to recall early childhood memories, adult narratives are frequently very sparse 37 : "I remember sitting in the kitchen sink with a toy army man, not really sure how I reached the sink, but I remember that there was music", or "I remember sitting in my parents' bedroom, observing my mother as she did some house cleaning. There is nothing else to the memory, but I remember having a very different perspective of the room at the time."
However, in the courtroom, such narratives surprisingly contain considerably more detail. An example is provided by early events being recalled by a complainant who alleged sexual abuse when she was 3 years old (all reports have been made anonymous): "I was upstairs and I was playing in the spare room, and I was a bit upset. I was wearing my favourite pink dress and I remember him coming up to me … and he just picks me up and he just sat me on his lap and gave me a really big squeeze. He was wearing jeans and a t-shirt and would just sit there with his legs straight down in front of him. When he picked me up he would sit me facing the same way, he just pulled me really close in to him … he had his arms around my waist. I remember feeling uncomfortable." A similar level of detail was provided by another complainant when remembering an abusive event from the same age period: "I was in the house alone with him a lot of the time and he would take me into his room … he had a green solid pressed-wood headboard and blue flannel sheets on his bed. He would just lie there on top of the sheets, just sitting up on the bed with big feather pillows behind his head and just lie me next to him, to his right … and then I remember him, he was rubbing himself with his right hand, and then he would say 'why don't you feel it too?' I remember looking at him and then he would take my left hand and he would make me completely grab it and pleasure him. I remember thinking, 'this is disgusting'." These complainants' narratives are not only unusually rich in detail, they also contain concepts that are not normally available to children so young (for example, handedness and disgust). Moreover, these unusually detailed memories often include verbatim conversations that most of us could rarely, if ever, remember some decades later. This is not to say that adults who have experienced trauma in childhood cannot remember these events, particularly if these events are still viewed by the person as salient, life-changing experiences 95 . However, like all memories, recollection of traumatic experiences is reconstructive, subject to forgetting and prone to error 3 . For example, adults who recalled documented childhood sexual abuse experienced some 12 to 21 years earlier were able to accurately recollect core features of these experiences. However, these narratives were sparse on peripheral information and contained reconstructive errors 95 . Nature Reviews | Neuroscience visit happened, what I was wearing and who I was with) are not. It is this waning of episodic detail that can undermine the integrity and longevity of early memories and often leaves the adult rememberer with only vague and decontextualized recollections of the past 36, 37 
.
A fourth phenomenon that underpins the poor recollection of childhood memories is that information that has been stored becomes stable and better integrated within important knowledge structures only after several other cognitive changes have emerged. For example, the emergence of the cognitive self at around 18-24 months 38, 39 provides a structure within which memories can be embedded -a development that leads to more stable, hence potentially longer-lasting, memories [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] . Developments in language 31, [42] [43] [44] [45] (for example, development of pronoun use) and the sharing of our past experiences with others 43 (for example, parents) also contribute to the restructuring and enhanced retention of children's memories of recent experiences [42] [43] [44] [45] . There is some debate regarding whether this restructuring of memories in childhood by adult conversation partners changes the contents of children's memories or simply provides a culturally appropriate linguistic framework for talking about autobiographical experiences. Notwithstanding this debate, it is clear that children's conversations with parents about their autobiographical experiences increase the longevity of memories of these events 44, 45 . Importantly, a common-sense notion holds that emotional or traumatic events from our childhoods are remembered better than more neutral events. However, studies have consistently shown that adults' earliest memories are not memories that are highly emotional or traumatic but in fact are often devoid of emotional content 36, 37 . This finding is not unexpected given that infants and young children do not have the level of semantic knowledge needed to encode the meaning (in adult terms) of an event; any meaning given to events is constructed later, when the fragments are retrieved. In fact, when the details of a previously experienced event (for example, a visit to a fire station) are known and can be compared to what is later recalled, young children's (5-and 6-year-olds) subsequent recall rarely includes verbatim, emotional, temporal or introspective information 36 . Even specific questioning about the event does not elicit these details from young children, whereas reports from older children (9-and 10-year-olds) do contain such
Box 2 | Science and belief about memory
A recent court decision in the United Kingdom stated that: "it is difficult to see how … expert evidence can properly be tendered to establish a justifiable criticism of an adult witness who says that she suffered abuse throughout her childhood, which must have begun at too early an age for her to remember the first occasion [and who provided] highly specific details of abuse at such an early age. … the jury should consider their own experiences, searching their recollections for their earliest memories, and analysing what they could actually remember, and how far back their memories went. They did not require, and would not have been assisted by the evidence of an expert." (REF. 96 ). That is, "Eyewitness testimony has no scientific or technical underpinnings which would be outside the common understanding of the jury; therefore, expert testimony is not necessary to help jurors 'understand' the eyewitness' testimony" (REF. 97 ).
In an effort to understand whether 'common sense' views of memory are consistent with what the scientific study of memory has revealed, a number of researchers [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] have posed questions about how memory operates to various legal professionals -lawyers, law enforcement officers and judges -and to members of the general public who are eligible for jury service. These studies showed that the common-sense view of memory is frequently inconsistent with findings from memory research. For example, potential jurors believe that memory acts like a video recorder accurately registering a person's experiences, and that once recorded, such memories cannot be altered 14 , but there is a wealth of evidence showing that memory is reconstructive and fallible 25 . Of particular relevance here are studies that examine 'common sense' beliefs about early childhood memories. For example, a study 6 in which 111 jurors (people summoned for jury duty), 42 judges (with an average of 11.2 years on the bench) and 52 law enforcement personnel (detectives and police officers, with an average of 13 years of experience) were asked a series of questions about memory revealed that their understanding of issues related to how adults remember childhood experiences is severely limited. Relative to experts, individuals serving as law professionals and people who evaluate memory evidence in court have only limited knowledge of the memory-related issues that are relevant to how adults remember childhood experiences (see the figure) . The asterisks indicate a statistically significant different agreement rate versus experts. Data from REF. 6 . 
) of events experienced in early childhood, these narratives are unlikely to be based on memories alone and are likely to have been 'filtered' through the lens of the person's current worldview.
Findings from neurobiological studies. Of course, these behavioural changes in children's memory development do not occur in isolation but happen in tandem with, and to some extent are mediated by, important neurobiological changes. Developmental neuroscientists have documented these changes using an ever-growing toolkit with which to study brain development. These tools include structural MRI and diffusion tensor imaging to study changes in brain structure, and electroencephalography (EEG; which measures event-related potentials), magnetoencephalography and functional MRI (fMRI) to study changes in regional activity and functional connectivity. Studies using these tools have shown that changes in brain structure and function occur throughout childhood and adolescence. In terms of structure, cortical thinning (resulting in part from synaptic pruning) appears earlier in the primary sensory cortices than in the association cortices and the PFC 46, 47 , whereas white matter volume increases during development, mainly as a result of increases in myelination and axon diameter 47, 48 .
Findings from these studies suggest that changes in structural and functional connectivity in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) and the PFC that occur early in development (for example, the latter part of the first postnatal year) are associated with increases in the speed of information processing and in the longevity of memory traces 49 . These changes in memory longevity (that is, consolidation) involve maturation of MTL structures (for example, the hippocampus (in particular, the dentate gyrus), parahippocampus, entorhinal cortex and perirhinal cortex) into the latter part of the first postnatal year 17 . These areas of the MTL continue to develop during the first few years of life [50] [51] [52] and, together with changes in the dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) 51, [53] [54] [55] , serve to bind distributed representations into integrated memory traces.
Neuroimaging studies have examined the brain areas (mainly the MTL and PFC) involved in memory formation and retrieval in individuals aged 8-24 years. These include studies of both the automatic aspects of memory (that is, memory processes that may not be under conscious control; for example, feature sampling) and the strategic aspects of memory (that is, memory processes that are under conscious control; for example, semantic clustering of to-be-remembered information) during encoding and retrieval, and studies of changes in children's knowledge base 51, [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] .
Results have shown that dlPFC regions that mediate the encoding of detailed episodic representations of experiences may have a protracted period of development relative to the MTL 50,51,54-60 (but see , so that memory formation early in childhood depends more on MTL contributions 23, 33, 35, 64, 65 . It could be speculated that early reliance on the MTL may lead to sparser representations in memory, but as development proceeds, contributions from the PFC facilitate the encoding of more detail -especially detail that involves semantic processing 54, 63, 66 -and the storing of greater contextual and source information 51 . These findings are consistent with behavioural data showing that younger children have a qualitatively and quantitatively different knowledge base with more limited semantic processing than older children 23, 24 . Continued development of the hippocampus in middle childhood and adolescence also influences encoding and retrieval 63, 64 . Indeed, a recent fMRI study examining activation of brain regions during memory retrieval in 8-and 12-year-olds and adults found that age-related increases in semantic memory errors were related to changes in the pattern of engagement of the left anterior MTL, left posterior parietal cortex and the left ventrolateral PFC (vlPFC) 67 . Memory results in the accumulation of both abstract knowledge (the semantic component of autobiographical memory) and contextual or source details of individual experiences (the episodic component of autobiographical memory). Neuroimaging studies have found that memory formation is associated with activation of brain regions that are known to be content-sensitive. For example, a recent study 56 showed that the formation of memory for scenes was associated with activation of cortical areas that mediate the visual perception of scenes (that is, the parahippocampal place area 68 ). Memory for natural scenes improves during childhood and adolescence through to adulthood 69 , and these improvements correlate with changes in the activity of cortical areas specialized for scene processing during the encoding and subsequent representation of complex scenes 70 .
Other studies have examined the influence of changes in knowledge base and memory. In one study 58 , children (8.5 to 11.5 years of age) and adults participated in an encoding task that compared the encoding of noun-colour pairings that were either matched with one's world knowledge (for example, seeing the word tomato printed on a red background) or mismatched (for . The y-axis represents the proportion of memories recalled by adults; the x-axis represents the age of the person when a memory was originally stored. The data were obtained from several studies of autobiographical recall of childhood events by adults using different recall techniques 22 . The results show that people have very little memory for autobiographical experiences that occurred before the age of 2 years, few memories for events that occurred between the ages of 2 and 3 years and that the number of memories of events occurring later increases with the person's age at the time of the event. Importantly, it is not until around the age of 7 years that we begin to see mature levels of autobiographical remembering. example, seeing the word tomato printed on a blue background). While being scanned, participants viewed word-colour combinations and were asked if these combinations occurred in nature. Later, outside the scanner, participants were given a recognition test. Behavioural studies have routinely demonstrated that when the noun-colour pairings match, participants remember more of these items than when they mismatch. In this study 58 , adults remembered more than children, but all participants exhibited the congruency effect (that is, better recognition for congruent pairings). Neuroimaging data revealed that during the encoding phase, adults showed activity in regions known to be associated with semantic and conceptual processing (for example, the left PFC, parietal cortex and occipitotemporal cortex), whereas children showed activity in regions that are involved earlier in the processing sequence (for example, the right occipital cortex) 58 . That is, in adults, encoding relied more on neural substrates involved in semantic processing, whereas in children, encoding relied more on neural substrates involved in perceptual processing. Thus, consistent with the behavioural data, these findings show that the knowledge base of children is less well developed than that of adults, perhaps relying more on perceptuallevel processing than on semantic-level processing. As development proceeds, this perceptual-to-semantic shift depends on the ability to abstract knowledge from individually experienced episodes 61 , and this shift not only facilitates better correct recollection of information, it also begets more semantic errors (false memories) in adulthood than in childhood.
Increases in the functional connectivity of the PFC with regions in the MTL 35, 55 may also contribute to the emergence of cognitive control over memories (such as strategies for encoding and for monitoring retrieval) 35 . In terms of encoding, increased cognitive control lets children selectively attend to and store relevant versus irrelevant information, which leads to better integrated and more detailed memories of experiences 55 . For example, there is a positive correlation between age (in 8-to 14-year-olds) and the level of recruitment of the left dlPFC during the encoding of complex scenes, and this was associated with an age-related increase in memory for the contents of these scenes 60 .
In terms of retrieval, increased cognitive control lets children selectively remember and rehearse relevant information and selectively suppress or omit irrelevant information. For example, when examining retrieval of memories in children (8-to 12-year-olds) and adults, differences in activation patterns in several PFC areas (the left dlPFC, rostrolateral PFC and vlPFC) correlated with age 67 , suggesting developmental improvements in distinguishing relevant from irrelevant information in memory and better, more flexible use of semantic retrieval cues 71 .
Of course, additional changes in the MTL (for example, changes in cortical thickness and hippocampal volume) 61 also contribute to these developments in memory. Indeed, there is evidence that age-related increases in the functional specialization of the hippocampus and the posterior parahippocampal gyrus may have Figure 2 | Semantic representations in younger and older children. Differences between the knowledge bases of younger versus older children, established using non-metric multidimensional scaling solutions derived from INDSCAL (INDividual Differences SCALing) models of children's similarity ratings 26 . These solutions show Euclidean distances between concepts for 4-year-olds and 9-yearolds and illustrate age-related changes in the way that concepts are inter-related in semantic memory (knowledge base). The differences in the clustering of concepts in memory predict the types of memory confusions that occur in children of different ages (not shown). an important role in the increasing ability to construct detailed memories with age 51, 56 . For example, in an fMRI study, 14-year-olds and adults showed similar activity profiles in the anterior region of the hippocampus when encoding source information, whereas 8-to 11-year-olds' activity patterns were less differentiated 51 . Moreover, during retrieval of episodic information, activity in the anterior but not the posterior hippocampus was increased in adults, whereas children showed the reverse pattern 64 . Together, these neurobiological developments have important consequences for how children encode, store and retrieve their autobiographical experiences. Children become better at using selective attention to encode relevant information and engage in elaboration of information with information that is already stored in their knowledge base, in order to better integrate autobiographical information in memory. In addition, retrieval becomes more strategic (for example, distinguishing relevant from irrelevant memory contents and better use of semantic cues), and the contents of what is being retrieved are more likely to be filtered by monitoring processes as children get older. Many of these developments are contingent on changes in the PFC 72 . Indeed, the development of strategic retrieval is associated with increased activation of the left vlPFC, whereas developmental improvements in estimating the accuracy of what has been retrieved are associated with increased activation of the dlPFC 67 . Given the intricate interconnections between the PFC and the MTL, it is perhaps not surprising that the MTL also has a role in these improvements in retrieval 64 .
Together, the neurobiological evidence shows that several structural and functional changes are associated with the development of encoding, storage and retrieval abilities. These changes begin very early in life and continue through adolescence, and are both qualitative and quantitative in nature. In addition, changes in encoding processes (for example, increased binding), consolidation processes (for example, leading to greater longevity) and retrieval processes (for example, strategic monitoring) contribute to an increased ability to interpret and remember experiences and to retain them over longer and longer retention intervals.
Reconsolidation and long-term retention
It is not just the nature of early memory development that is important when adjudicating memory evidence about childhood events in the courtroom but also how well such traces are maintained over the ensuing decades. Because our memories are used not just to remember a past and interpret our present but also to plan for and anticipate our future, our memory system needs to be dynamic and responsive to changes that occur with experience 1,2 . Reconsolidation is one process that allows memories to remain relevant by updating them with current information 73 . When memory traces are reactivated during their retrieval, they re-enter a labile state and must stabilize again if they are to persist 4, 5 . It is during this reconsolidation process that memories are updated with new information through strengthening, weakening, changing or even erasing what was already stored. Because we do not consciously register these reconsolidation processes, memories can be distorted or eliminated without our awareness.
Of course, it is obvious to most people that memories can be forgotten and that there are ways in which people can forestall such forgetting (for example, through reinstatement and rehearsal or by conversing with others about our experiences). There is a considerable body of evidence showing that children's ability to use forestalling strategies increases with age 24, [74] [75] [76] [77] . However, these strategies themselves can have memory-distorting consequences, which may lead to the blending of the current contents of one's experiences (including suggestions or elaborations of information that occur during conversations with others or by exposure to material extracted from newspapers, magazines, television or social media) with information retrieved from memory 25, 78 . Because the contents of our current experiences can blend with what has been reactivated in memory, and these altered contents get reconsolidated in memory, attempts to forestall forgetting can have detrimental effects when one is trying to accurately recollect autobiographical events, for example, in the courtroom. Indeed, the neuroscience underlying reconsolidation shows just how insidious these memory distortion processes can be, as the changes that arise as a result of reconsolidation are not privy to conscious inspection (for example, occurring at a neurochemical level) 4, 5 . Thus, a rememberer will be unaware of these transformational processes and will never know whether what they are remembering actually happened, is some distortion of what occurred or never happened at all.
Effects of stress and trauma on memory A 'common sense' belief about memory is that memories of stressful and traumatic experiences are protected from being lost or distorted and are preserved outside the experiencer's conscious awareness (for example, repressed) until a cue (such as a newspaper article or a television programme) suddenly brings them back into conscious awareness 1, 25 (BOX 2). In fact, stress and trauma can have both positive (memory enhancing) and negative (memory impairing) effects: extreme levels of stress impair memory, whereas moderate levels can strengthen memory 79 . Although hormones released during stress -adrenaline and cortisol -modulate consolidation and memory strength, this does not mean that these memories are immune to forgetting, distortion or even possible erasure 79 . In addition, stress impairs retrieval, particularly of autobiographical memories 79 , and stress during reconsolidation can also lead to systematic distortions 4, 5 . Importantly, the systems that mediate stress undergo key changes during childhood. For example, the hippocampus and the amygdala change from early childhood through adolescence in terms of increased volume and increased connectivity between the amygdala and the hippocampus 48 . There are also effects of prolonged stress (for example, child maltreatment) on the developing brain that can involve alterations in the neural structures that underpin memory, including the hippocampus, amygdala and the medial PFC. Long-term stress has particularly deleterious effects on structures that are rich in glucocorticoid receptors, such as the hippocampus and basolateral nucleus of the amygdala 80 . One consequence of long-term stress is poorer consolidation of emotional information, including through inhibition of neurogenesis, in rodents [81] [82] [83] [84] , primates 85 and possibly humans 86, 87 . Although the role of adult neurogenesis in memory consolidation in humans is hotly debated 86, 87 , there is evidence 88 that in adult humans, new neurons are added each day to the hippocampus at a rate commensurate with that found in some non-human animals. The role that new hippocampal neurons may have in human memory remains to be explored, but it has been speculated that neurogenesis reduces interference between overlapping memories formed at different points in time 88, 89 . Regardless, there is evidence that the inhibition of neurogenesis leads to poorer storage (and hence retention) of stressful memories in non-human animals [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] 90 . Some of the negative effects of early-life stress in humans 91, 92 and non-human animals 93 can be ameliorated by modifying the environment -for example, by removing the stressor or through social enrichment -but the effectiveness of such interventions depends not only on their timing but also on the timing, duration, intensity and frequency of exposure to stressors during development. Overall, the fact that an event was stressful or traumatic is not a good predictor of a child's (or an adult's) subsequent memory for that event.
Implications for the courtroom In legal cases involving historic childhood experiences, the main evidence consists of a complainant's narrative recall of decadesold memories. These narratives are often remarkable not just for their detail but also for the inclusion of concepts and knowledge (for example, temporal information) that someone who was very young -for example, 2-5 years of age -at the time of the event could not possibly have understood 94 . In these cases, judges and jurors may have to use 'common sense' to evaluate the reliability of the memory-based evidence. As I hope this article has demonstrated, the scientific study of memory does not support the 'common sense' notions (BOX 2) that many judges and jurors use in judicial cases in which adult recollections of childhood experiences serve as the only evidence. First, cognitive and neurobiological changes during development affect how information is encoded, stored and retrieved, and thereby constrain the content and durability of these memories. Second, memories can change during the storage of new information through the process of reconsolidation. Third, because memories are used to understand the world around us, we extract abstract knowledge (semantic memory) from stored experiences, often at the expense of the specific, episodic details about that experience. Thus, when we try to remember a particular childhood experience, the memory is often fragmentary and decontextualized, and meaning-based (semantic) reconstructive processes 'fill in the gaps' so that our narrative about these events seems to be sensible.
It is important that judges and jurors know that the contents of narratives about childhood events should be gauged with respect to the age of the person at the time at which the event was encoded 22, 31 . Narratives from younger children (5-to 6-year-olds) rarely include emotional, temporal, introspective or verbatim information, even when the children are directly questioned about these aspects of an event that they have experienced 31, 36 . Thus, if testimony about events that occurred early in childhood contains such elements, one should be sceptical about the veracity of that information and not assume that this level of detail increases the credibility of the complainant's narrative. The important questions are: which parts of the narrative reflect things that probably did happen (if any); and how can we distinguish those facts from distortions that may have arisen through reconstructive remembering processes?
Importantly, processes such as reconsolidation occur outside consciousness, and a rememberer will often not be aware that their memories have been transformed. This means that when judging the veracity of the narrative, it is not useful to look for signs of deception (or to assess levels of confidence). It is also important for jurors and judges to know that experiences that are encoded, stored or retrieved during times of stress are not more likely to be remembered. Indeed, stress can actually impair the encoding and storage of autobiographical experiences and reduce the ability to retrieve specific episodic information during subsequent recall attempts.
These scientific findings stand in stark contrast to judges' and jurors' beliefs about memory and its development
. This gap needs to be closed so that decisions about guilt or innocence in the courtroom reflect the scientific 'truths' about memory and not simply 'common sense' beliefs of judges and jurors. Such knowledge should help jurors and others to evaluate memory-based evidence properly and would not usurp but rather aid the judges' and jury's primary role of deciding the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Legal policy, procedures and practice should include a consideration of a memory expert's evidence, and this evidence should be given its proper weight when a defendant's guilt or innocence is being determined primarily or solely on the basis of adults remembering childhood experiences.
